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Pentecostalism is the most dynamic religious movement in the world today.
This is why it is signifìcant that the Religion Monitor's data allow it to be studied
rather closely in several countries.
Pentecostalism is only 100 years old. Especially in the so-called Third World,
it is growing precipitously even as its religious orientations and forms of organ-
ízatton are strongly in flux. After just 100 years, it already comprises a third of all
Christians worldwide (521 million, versus a total of 1,,475 million, according to
Figure 1: Pentecostals and Charismatics vs. other Christians, 2000
Latin America North America Oceania
E Pentecostals/Charismatics I OtherChristians
Source: Banett 2001
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Barrelt 2001). It shouid be noted that in Barrett's data, what we refer to here as
the Pentecostal movement includes all Christians who consider themselves Pen-
tecostal or Charismatic and pursue the corresponding religious praxis. Catholics
and Protestants-not just members of organized Pentecostal churches-are
therefore also included in Barrett's calculations.
These statistics testify to strong growth dynamics. They also hint at how
much power the Pentecostal church and the Christians it influences have in
shaping many societies and representing Christianity in the world-even if
Europeans, in their splendid isolation, have not yet paid much notice. In the
Southern Hemisphere, a "new Christendom" (|enkins 2002) is developing as
Catholicism changes and, above all, as Pentecostalism spreads. However, Pente-
costalism is significantly harder than Catholicism to analyze from a sociology of
religion perspective.
U r¡tlcrstanci inq FeniecostaIisnt frotn a socio ioqir;ri pe r::per.tive
Its fluidity and versatile adaptability give Pentecostalism the character of a social
movement (in a strong socioÌogical sense) that has virtually nothing in common
with the European model of instilutionalized religion. The actors in Pentecostal-
ism-both individual and collective-react strongly to changes in the social con-
text and rapidly adjust their strategies to a variety of dynamics. To be sure, cer-
tain patterns of perception, thought, and action solidify over time, and
organizational structures emerge. Even so, most actors within the movement-
especially the leading ones-are highly versatile.
For this reason, I regard Pierre Bourdieu's social theory as particularly well
suited to understanding this movement. I have also seen this repeatedly con-
firmed since the early 1980s in research projects on Pentecostalism and through
my own intensive collaboration with the Latin American Pentecostalist move-
ment. This puts the movement's individual and collective actors in the center of
interest. Previous research has examined the connection between social posi-
tions and religious dispositions (Schäfer 2005, 2006). Starting from Max Weber's
tradition and Pierre Bourdieu's elaboration of it, this article aims to understand
the religious meaning that actors ascribe to their practices, particularly in con-
nection with their specific social-struclural conditions. In shorl: For which social
status does a given set of religious convictions provide these actors the most
plausible explanations and suggest the most reasonable options for actionl This
conceptualizes social transformation processes and cleavages as relevant to reli-
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gious praxis; conversely, religious praxis is also relevant to social processes. This
approach incidentally is also consistent with a widespread self-perception within
the movement as well as conclusions of Walter Hollenweger (199a),the doyen of
research on Pentecostalism.
Although the Religion Monitor unfortunately does not present any data on
social structures that could be used to statistically operationalize this question, it
contains excellent data on actors'religious convictions and practices, particularly
in regard to their cognitive and emotional perceptions and processing of specific
experiences of time and space. These data can be interpreted in the context of
the various countries' broader social environment by drawing on the literature
andrrry own knowledge of the field.
Pentecostalism's aforementioned fluidity means that there is anything but
consensus on its composition. Above all, it is clear that strictly speaking, a single,
homogenous Pentecostal movement does not exist. Rather, highly varied forms
of religious praxis and organization have emerged-different currents, so to
speak. A very brief sketch of the history of Pentecostalism is thus in order. It
arose from the Holiness Movement (which in turn has roots in Methodism) at
the beginning of the 20th century in the united States. while it was ethnically
mixed at first-particularly at its main church, rhe Azuza street Revival in Los
Angeles-white congregations soon segregated themselves and organized as the
Assemblies of God (AoG). very rapidly-and partly in parallel with this last
development in the United States-Pentecostal activities also appeared in Latin
America (Chile), India (only marginally), and Europe (especially Norway).
With regard to social structLrre, the black congregations in the United States
generally continued to be linked to the underclass and limited advancement; the
white churches, by contrast, established themselves in the consolidated, conseï-
vative middle class. crucially, a new current catering to the American upper-mid-
dle and upper classes, neo-Pentecostalism, appeared in the 1950s with the found-
ing of the Full Gospel Businessmen's Fellowship International (FGBMFI).
In the 1960s, the Charismatic movement picked up the Pentecostal impulse
and interpreted it for the upper middle class in mainline Protestantism. Over
time, these last two currents amalgamated in a variety of ways. Then, in the
1980s, conservative Evangelical churches also took up Pentecostal practices in
the so-called third wave. During this, neo-Pentecostalism, in particular, tended
toward radicalization, established religious media empires, and contributed to
the revival of Protestant fundamentalism in the united States. In missionary
activities, which burgeoned dunng the 1980s, it is mainly the established major
churches such as the AoG and neo-Pentecostal groups that have been active.
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In the course of the 20th century, the spread of Pentecostalism followed
the trail of the rapid and convulsive sociai change in the Third World. At the
same time, the movement formed an inner structure capable of reacting flexibly
to a wide range of social demands on religious actors. The most important
change in roughly the past 30 years is the emancipation of the Pentecostal
churches in the Third World, which is associated with social differentration and
transnational mission activities that originated in those countries, among other
things.
Given this history, analysis of the data first requires us to formulate a defini-
tion of Pentecostalism. Defìnitions should reflect the observer's theoretical
approach and be grounded in the object of study only to a limited extent. When
researchers rely too heavily on their subjects' self-understanding, they can easily
end up with a glut of categories or types. This is the case with Barrett (2001),
who refers to (denominational) Pentecostals, neo-Pentecostals, Charismatics,
neo-Charismatics, first-, second, and third-wavers, post-Pentecostals, and post-
Charismatics, but then subsumes all of these categories under "Pentecostal/
Charismatic" in his statistical summary.
The Pew Forrm takes an entirely different approach. It defines both catego-
ries, Pentecostal and Charismatic, based on a combination of religious organiza-
tional stmclures and respondents' self-understanding. "Pentecostal" thus refers
to someone who belongs to an established Pentecostal and/or Charismatic Chris-
tian church, which vary as widely as the AoG and the Igreja Universal do Reino
de Deus (IURD). "Charismatic" is any Christian-irrespective of confession-
who identifies as either Charismatic or Pentecostal but does not belong to any
such church, or who "speaks in tongues" multiple times per year. Both catego-
ries are subsumed under the umbrella rubric of "renewalists."
Yet a third approach generates categories from historical knowledge of the
movement and observations of its social structutes. Such categorizations are
based more on previous scholarly studies of religious praxis than on the actors'
self-understandings. A social-structural distinction between traditional and neo-
Pentecostalism, roughly speaking, has emerged from my fieldwork on the move-
ment in Central America. This distinction has proven informative and helpful
over my two decades of research, validation and close work with the the Pente-
costal movement in Latin America. However, it is merely a heuristic model,
though one that is definitely also capable of revealing completely very different
and unexpected conditions. Precisely this "understanding" and "interpretive"
approach (Weber) to the production of meaning and to the actions of actors pre-
vents facts from being sacrificed to theory.
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Based on these considerations, a (less complex) interim solution to the defi-
nitional problem had to be found for the Religion Monitor-one that would also
invite the respondents to place themselves in one of the categories. The distinc-
tion between "Pentecostal" and "charismatic" presented itself because-at least
in its usage in Germany, the united States, and Latin America-it is most likely
to produce systematicaliy interesting differentiations. Yet this distinction has not
yielded adequately good resuits everywhere. Apart from the interviewers in
Korea leaving out a whole category, a likely reason for this is demarcation strug-
gles within the movement as its adherents further differentiate themselves.
Those who belong to a new group within neo-Pentecostaiism (such as power
evangelism) tend not to want to be identifìed with "traditional" Pentecostals or
Charismatics and respond to the interviewer with "evangelic" or "other."
Also, because many (predominantly poor) members of the pentecostal move-
ment presumably lack a telephone, phone surveys distort the findings (not to
mention other sampling problems among marginal religious actors). pentecos-
tals and charismatics may be significantly underrepresented as a result. con-
versely, a number of Pentecostals may be concealed in the categories "protes-
tant," "evangelical-independent," and "other."
The sample sizes for Pentecostals and Charismatics are actuaily too small-
with the exception of Nigeria (231and 2), where face-to-face interviews were con-
ducted-to support reliable conclusions. But they are large enough in the united
States (34 and 11) and Brazil (54 and 19) to be interpreted as indicators in the
context of the scholarly literature and in-depth knowledge of the Pentecostal
movement in those countries.
One may also safely assume that those respondents who describe themselves
as Pentecostal or charismatic do indeed belong to these groups. To maximize
the significance of these small samples, I generally combine the pentecostals
and Charismatics into a single category for purposes of calculation and contrast
them with Protestants ("evangelic" plus "evangelical-independent"). "Other"
confessions are excluded from consideration.
Pentecostalism, total populations and social structure
General demographic observations yield the following picture. If one considers
the Pentecostal movement worldwide in relation to other Christians (Figure 1)
or in individual countries compared to their total population (Figure 2), its low
percentage in Cermany is especially striking. This can be aftributed to several
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Figure 2: Pentecostals and Charismatics as a percent of 2000 population
Guatemala
Source: Barrett 2001 All data in percent
factors. One is definitely the close conneclions among the Enlightenment, secu-
larization and rationalism. Another is the longstanding hegemony of the offìcial
churches in the religious arena. A third reason would be that stable social sys-
tems provide a cushion against existential uncertainty. A fourth might be the
commodity fetishism of capitalist consumer societies that propagandizes the ful-
fìllment of human existence through the consumption of goods.
At any rate, the fìrst stirrings of the movement around 1906 in Cassel were
rapidly absorbed or marginalized by the Evangelical Community Movement
(Evangelische Gemeinschaftsbewegung) within the established Protestant
churches. Only today are postmodem charismatic groups and Afücan immi-
grants' churches beginning to arouse a certain interest among the public. In
South Korea, the spread of Pentecostalism has mn up against a very strong sha-
manist and Buddhist tradition. The movement was able to take advantage of the
sense of crisis and the process of social upheaval following the Korean War and
as the country was modernizing very rapidly. In particular, the Yoido Gospel
Church-which began as Pentecostal and later became neo-Pentecostal-has
managed to establish a very solid foundation with a message of prosperity aimed
at the ambitious lower middle dass. It has thus strongiy advanced the trend of
the Korean middle class being mobilized by Protestantism. However, Korea will
not be discussed further below because the RM includes no data on its Pentecos-
tal churches.
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Nigeria has been predominantiy Islamic in its northern regions (43 % of tine
population, according to Barrett) for some time now. If Pentecostals make up
32 percent of the total population, one can assume that Pentecostal churches
strongly dominate the country's Christian south. A significant portion of these
are African-influenced Aladura churches, which ever since the 1930s have incor-
porated Pentecostal impuises into an ethnically oriented form of African piety.
The Aladura churches make evideni that the more European and rigid praxis
of piety historically linked to Protestantism (the "orthodox churches," as they are
calied in Nigeria) were unable to adequately adapt culturally; not so for the Pen-
tecostal churches. The conflict-ridden modernization of this oil-rich nation has
fostered the growth of both Pentecostalism and Islam. Since the 1990s, new
groups aimed at the middle class have appeared within Pentecostalism, rapidly
gaining formative influence to such an extent that young urban Muslims are try-
ing to integrate charismatic practices.
The comparatively low percentage of Pentecostals in Guatemala in the face of
a strong Protestant presence dating back to the 19th century (see the article on
Latin America) is due partly to the strong position of Evangelical churches
among the conservative and more reserved indigenous population of the high-
lands. A further explanation is that social change has been less discontinuous in
this area than in the agro-industrialized lowlands. Yet one should not conclude
that Pentecostalism carries little weight in Guatemala. The situation in Guate-
mala is distinguished mainly by the strong position of neo-Pentecostal churches,
part of whose clientele belongs to Guatemala's upper class and wields significant
political influence. As a result, on the one hand these churches have managed to
establish quite a strong influence on society and politics; on the other hand, the
Pentecostal movement in Guatemala is marked even more strongly by social
cleavages than in other countries. Guatemala cannot be included in the analysis
here. Except for six cases, all respondents termed themselves "evangé1icos,"
mostly likely due to conformity and reticence (and especially since this category
was mentioned before the "Pentecostal" category).
The figures for BrazlT are explained by the Pentecostal movement's early and
strong presence there, dating from 1910, along with its role in the cataclysmic
modernization and migration processes resulting fromBraztT's industrializalion
and rural exodus that have transformed the entire country. A further explanation
is the decline in the Catholic Church's control over the religious field due to lib-
eral influence in politics and cultural pluralism. InBraziI, too, the growing influ-
ence of neo-Pentecostal churches with a strong claim to shaping society has
been noticeable since the 1990s at the latest.
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Finally, the United States is the birthplace of the Pentecostal movement.
Though it established itself as a religious force relatively cluickly, from its begin-
nings the movement faced tough competition from Evangelical and mainstream
Protestants and from a well-consolidated Cathoiic Church. As already sketched
above, neo-Pentecostal churches have taken up strong positions in the United
States over the past 20 years (Schäfer 2008).
All and all, the following conclusions can be derived from the differences and
commonalities among countries. First, Pentecostal churches grow especially fast
in the context of conflict-ridden and fragmentary modernization. The typical sit-
uation of converts is relative deprivation: people whose situation noticeably dete-
riorates, through no fault of their own, compared to the situation of their socially
similar counterparts and compared to their own expectations. This can happen
to individuals in any circumstances-by no means only those in poverty. The
religious praxis and symbolism of the Pentecostal movement is-to a much
greater extent than those of traditional Protestantism-suitable for imbuing
such situations with meaning, interpreting conflict and change in religious
terms, and helping actors find new social strategies. Second, widely varying Pen-
tecostal churches around the world are united into a large movement through
their similar inventory of religious symbols and through identification with each
other. This produces a specific type of identity that is intrinsically globally ori-
ented, which enables transnational mobility or just identification with significant
others, even virtual others. Third, the social structure in each location exerts a
major influence on the local form of the Pentecostal movement. This, in turn,
results in tensions and alienation within the movement, which stand out to an
observer only upon close scrutiny.
That the Pentecostal movement does not represent a cohesive entity-nor
unequivocally a church of the marginalized-is already evidenced by the debates
over its definition. But the key to understanding its variety can by no means be
found only in its theological traditions or the self-attributions of its adherents.
Instead, one must grasp the complicated interplay between a society's differen-
tial demands for religious meaning and the meanings that various groups offer.
Social stmctural factors such as income, education, ethnicity, gender, future
prospects related to one's position, and so on, all substantially influence this.
The more flexibly a religious community can adapt its identity-forming religious
content to its social conditions, the greater success it will have among the people
affected, parlicularly when social change is rapíd. That is Pentecostalism's recipe
for success. The fluidity of religious symbols within the movement is fostered by
one factor in the church's organization: Unlike Catholicism, there is no magiste-
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rium and no overarching hierarchy, though there is sometimes a strict hierarchy
within a given church. This means that new groups with new profiles can arise
again and again in response to changes in society or within the church. The
metaphor for the movement's organization is a network, not a hierarchy, includ-
ing and especially on the transnational level-a crucial aspect, though it cannot
be further elaborated here.
Regarding the movement's growing internal organization and its currents,
one can nonetheless roughly distinguish several Iypes, rnutøtis mutandis. How-
ever, one must keep in mind that these are "pure" types, idealized clusters in the
religious field if you will; in the reality of society, one must attend to mutual
influences, special developmental paths, and the like.
The classic type is the large, established church with centralized administra-
tion and international missionary activity: AoG, Church of God (Cleveland), etc.
With their missionary work, these churches have done the most to spread Pente-
costalism internationally since the first half of the 20th century and have given it
an American flavor. In the United States, these churches are rooted in the mid-
dle class; in Third World countries, most of their members tend to belong to the
lower strata, while the leadership and a few of the central congregations can be
deemed middle class.
These churches increasingly tend toward Evangelical models of piety and
demand holiness and distance from the "world" as their adherents' basic reli-
gious attitudes. However, one must consider that the different class affiliations
of these churches' members can also result in distinctly different profìles of
piety and patterns of identity within an organizational entity of these churches.
For instance, ascetic forms might prevail emong the leadership and in middle-
class congregations, while apocalyptic forms might carry more weight in lower-
class congregations. Since about the 1950s-and in Africa partly in the course of
decolonization-national churches have repeatedly split off from these classic
Pentecostal churches in the "mission countries" (Príncipe de Paz, Guatemala;
Yoido Gospel, Korea;African Instituted Churches, etc.).
The independent churches that began in this manner make up the second
type. Compared to the established, classic Pentecostal churches, they gain their
capital precisely by adapting to special local demands for religious meaning.
This is how the African Instituted Churches in sub-Saharan Africa developed
their profile, for example. Independent religious production allows paüerns of
ritual and religious convictions specific to a culture to be integrated and
reshaped (elements of ancestor worship, healing ceremonies, belief in ghosts,
etc.). Similarly, Pentecostal churches are springing up in Latin America that
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draw on Indian culture and emphatically call themselves indigenous Pentecostal
churches. Moreover, in an urban milieu these churches often form in moderniz-
ing sectors of the lower classes (industrial workers, coal miners, etc.) and in the
informal sector. In every regard they offer (ethnically or socioeconomically)
marginalized sectors of the population important foci for social organizaríon.
Their models of piety often center on spirituaÌ presence (glossolalia), empow-
erment of members, and the healing of physical and especially psychic afflic-
tions. In the slums of Third World countries, this type of Pentecostal church has
been a decisive factor in social survival and in organizing. Incidentally, the
lower-class parishes of the Catholic Charismatic movement-which the Catholic
clergy supports as an antidote to independent Pentecostal churches-function
similarly.
fust as cÌass-specific, albeit oriented toward the upper middle class, is the third
type: the neo-Pentecostal churches (including the so-called third wave). This
movement's first organization in the United States was the FGBMFI, which has
targeted the upper class worldwide since the 1960s. Despite social diversification,
the movement still focuses mainly on the upwardly mobile middle class.
Since the 1970s, an increasing number of communities from the United
States have been implanted in the Third World (such as El Verbo in Guatemala)
and existing churches have been recast as neo-Pentecostal (through the activities
of Youth with a Mission, for instance). Shortly after this, upwardly mobile locals
began to found their own churches (Nigeria's Sword of the Spirit, Brazil's
IURD, Guatemala's Fraternidad Cristiana, etc.). Many of these understand them-
selves as communities "where well-to-do people congregate" who even in reli-
gious terms "have something special that normal, superstitious Pentecostals
1ack," as an adherent of the Hombres Cristianos in Guatemala told me. A partic-
ular feature of these actors' religious identity is their belief that they will gain
material wealth through their engagement on behalf of the church (prosperity
gospel) coupled with personal empowerment through the Holy Spirit. These
churches are generally quick to achieve social and political influence, not least
due to their financial ability to buy television networks, publish newspapers, pro-
duce recordings, and so on. Due to a broad range of factors, the extent of their
political engagement varies (healy involvement in the United States and Guate-
mala, less so in Nigeria). But in any event, upwardly mobile modernizers deter-
mine the style of these communities.
Groups of this type have grown into the megachurches of the Third World and
the United States. Many of them also cooperate with upper-middle-dass Catholic
Charismatics. Some of these neo-Pentecostal churches grew out of independent
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churches that belong generally to the classic type (Redeemed Christian Church
of God [RCCG], Nigeria; Elim, Guatemala; Deus é Amor IIPDA], Brazl; etc.) and
have undergone a transformation toward the neo-Pentecostal model. While they
are relatively weakly organized ("established sects" in Milton Yinger's model) as a
result of this (and also other factors), th"y nonetheless reach a discipleship drawn
from multiple social classes. My research in Latin America clearly shows, however,
that diflerent religious styles predominate in socially varied congregations.
This fact draws attention to a second strand of differentiation: internal reli-
gious organizatton. Especially in classic Pentecostalism and in neo-Pentecostal-
ism, the distance is great-both socially and in the church's struchrre-between
lower-class members and leading functionaries of the church. Neo-Pentecostal
churches reinforce and legitimate this distance with special offices, parlicularly
those of "Apostles," which endows the church leaders with inviolable authority,
similar to papal infallibility, but with a broader base of recognition. Mid-level
leadership jobs in megachurches, such as Brazil's IURD and Nigeria's RCCG,
are coveted upwardly-mobile positions that offer not just good incomes but also
management training and first-rate social contacts. Some of these churches own
banks, holdings, real estate, media companies, and large legal departments in
which the clergy enjoy a special position. Some churches, such as the IURD,
even have their "own" members of parliament.
Finally, lower- and middle-class members contribute a major part of these
churches' financing with their tithes and donations. The IURD, for example, has
developed an elaborate system that is a Pentecostal version of selling indulgen-
ces, which is based on an interplay between promises of material prosperity and
threats of demonic possession. At the same time, neo-Pentecostal megachurches
are building more and more educational and social organizations. Their man-
agement again requires mid-level clerical leaders, thus converting religious capi-
tal into social and finally economic capital.
In this context, the Religion Monitor data offer insights into respondents'
religious practices and convictions. In accordance with the sociology of religion
theory outlined above, these insights allow conclusions to be drawn about the
actors' religious identities and strategies. Of particular importance for grounding
religious agency, in its broadest sense, are religious paradigms connected to the
perception of space and time. Believers will perceive different opporbunities and
constraints in different ways depending on these paradigms. The precondition
for this, however, is that religious faith must actually be relevant for a given per-
son. One must therefore first inquire into the centrality of religion and the inten-
sity of religious praxis.
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I will explore these and all subsecluent themes using the examples of Nigeria,
BraziI, and the United States, for which the best data are available. Occasionally,
I will draw on Germany by way of illustration. After first analyzing the experien-
tial components of Pentecostal religiosity, I will discuss religious concepts of
space and time and conclude by outlining political and transnational strategies.
Experiential religiosity
In contrast to Protestantism's historical rationalism, Pentecostal religiosity is based
on practical experience. Worship services, fasting and prayer groups, ecstatic
practices such as "speaking in tongues" (discussed below), prophecy and trances,
exorcism, and faith healing are decisive reference points for constituting Pente-
costal identity. One result of experience "with all the senses" is that the cognitive
level of identity is closely interwoven with the affective and corporal levels.
Staunch Pentecostals consequentþ view their faith as an integral part of their
lives, which cannot be segregated out of daily praxis into a "subsystem" of life
but instead determines their entire lives.
The centrality of religion (see also the article on Latin America) is virtually
selÊevident to Pentecostals. Religion afiects all realms of life; its praxis is thus
not limited to liturgical exercises or specific times and places. In addition, the
praxis of piety is enthusiastic.
In the Religion Monitor's statistics on the centrality of religiosity, differences
stand out fìrst of all between Germany (or Centrai Europe) and the Third World
countries as well as the United States, which occupies an intermediate position.
Compared to Nigeria and Brazil, Germany shows a high percentage of individu-
als who are non-religious or only moderately religious. On the one hand, this is
an expression of European secularizatton. On the other hand, these fìndings
indicate the major role that religion plays in private and public life in Nigeria
and Brazil. Despite all the social upheaval and modernization of the colonial and
neo-colonial eras, religion v/as not eradicated in Afüca and Central America.
Both continents developed their own more or less precarious forms of modernity
in which religion plays a striking role.
Religious praxis has also changed in the process. Tribal religions in Africa
and indigenous religions and folk Catholicism in Latin America are being
replaced by mobilized Catholicism, Islam and increasingly Pentecostalism. The
general openness to religiosity that is evident in the Third World constitutes an
ideal opening for the Pentecostal movement. In contrast to Europe, where expe-
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Figure 3: Centrality of religiosity by country
Germany
E Non-religious I Religious ú Highly religious All data in percent
riential, emotional religiosity is incomprehensible to most people, Pentecostal
emotionality and spontaneity represent an elaboration of traditional piety, with
the further advantage of offering adecluate responses to the frictions and contra-
dictions of modernization processes.
With respect to particular forms of religious praxis, data from the Religion
Monitor clearly confirm that Pentecostalism is at the avant-garde of modern
Christianity when it comes to lived piety. In all three countries under study
here-the United States, BraziI and Nigeria-the findings for frequency of
attending religious services and engaging in prayer rank at the very top (tending
toward "very important," with a combined average for all countries of M:1.61
on a five-point scale). This is signifìcantly higher than the likewise high scores
for other Christians (who tend toward "fairly important," M : 2.38).
It is important to note here that the Pentecostal movement cultivates ecstatic
worship practices as part of religious services and prayer. In contrast to the Cath-
oìi. littrgy and the austere attitude toward the Word of God in Protestantism
(and Islam), Pentecostal worship activities range from lively, upbeat communal
singing (always with rhythmic clapping) to collective glossolalia (speaking in
tongues), exorcisms and ecstatic trances.
Services can vary widely with regard to spontaneity and the usage of certain
practices. In neo-Pentecostal megachurches, it is very common for assistants to
prepare for and instigate glossolalia and trances. During my fieldwork, I was
545
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able to observe training in this (which of course is not public). Ecstasy and tran-
ces play a similarly key role in the small independent churches, though they are
generally more spontaneous and develop in a much less controlled manner. Col-
lective glossolalia-ecstatic utterances that are not even understandable to the
speaker-is often the transition into trancelike phases during worship services.
It too can waver between a routinized program and spontaneous ecstatic expres-
s10n.
Moreover, glossolalia plays a central role in personal prayer at home in inten-
sifying an emotional piety that defies intellectual rationality. Such powerful emo-
tional experiences are highly ambivalent. On the one hand, they allow for a
catharsis of the soul; the literature has found this to be more true for glossolalia
during personal prayer than for the collective phenomenon. On the other hand,
they have been repeatedly exploited to manipulate masses of believers.
The praxis of worship can be interpreted from two further perspectives: reli-
gious symbolism and social practice. In the symbolic practices of worship, every-
day problems-alcoholism, economic failure, experiences of violence, etc.-
become the direct object of religious activities. This means that they are trans-
ferred from the various fields of praxis where they are experienced into the fìeld
of religious authority where they are dealt with, and sometimes solved, with the
tools of religious logic. More than a few Pentecostals have gone dry after chants
and exorcisms to drive out alcoholic demons.
In religious praxis, the tight integration of experiences in various fields with
entirely different concepts of power relations is precisely what lends Pentecostal
rituals their social persuasiveness. Instead of the power of addiction, for exam-
p1e, the power of the Holy Spirit is in charge. The people involved are moved to
rccognize the efficacy of the Spirit, its representatives, and its rituals, to invest
their faith in them-and to actually behave differently in fields of praxis other
than those of religion.
Situation-specific spontaneity, as found in the small, independent Pentecostal
churches, is particularly effective in this way, not least because it is seconded by
a manageably sized religious community. Anyone who has publicly experienced
liberation from possession can also count on practical help from the congrega-
tion. This is where a second practical function of Pentecostal worship has trac-
tion. The congregations constitute spaces that offer mutual tmst and obligation
as well as informal provision of mutual aid or even job prospects (see also the
article on Latin America).
Pentecostals' primary experiences of God occur through worship services and
personal prayer.lt is striking that with respect to experiences of God, Pentecos-
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tals differ more sharply from Evangelicals and mainstream Christians in the
United States than in Nigeria or Brazil. This may be because the Pentecostal
movement in the United States has long sought to defìne itself clearly against
well-established Evangelical Protestantism. Where Pentecostalism emphasizes
experience and charismatic legitimation, Evangelicals concentrate on texts and
rational, legalistic legitimation. Only in the past 20 years with the third wave
have these boundaries become more porous. Evangelical congregations have
been drawn closer to neo-Pentecostal models of legitimation and piety-a devel-
opment of major signifìcance to the neo-Pentecostal and charismatic reshaping
of American fundamentalism.
In the Third World, the history of Protestantism has given less impetus to
sharp demarcations. Historically, the Protestantism of the old missionary churches
and the Evangelical missions never put down deep enough roots in the populace
to be able to halt the "Pentecostalization" of many of their congregations at an
early stage. Congregations, churches, and spiritual leaders who did not follow
this trend have fallen into a marginal position in the religious field.
With regard to Pentecostals' religious experience as such, it is striking that
positive experiences are strongly emphasized. Pentecostals experience "strength,"
"gratitude," and"joy" almost "very often" (M : 4.65) and without much variation
among themselves (standard deviation SD = .50). They "often" (M : 3.70) experi-
ence "liberation from evil powers." This accords with the theological teachings
promoted by neo-Pentecostal groups.
For Pentecostals, these experiences of piety go together with the certainty that
God intervenes in their lives, ranging from "often" to "very often," whether in
the United States, Brazi., or Nigeria (M of about 4.15). But comparing Pentecos-
tals in the various countries with non-Pentecostal Christians reveals an interest-
ing difference. In the United States, 67 percent of Pentecostals believe God often
intervenes in their lives, but only 19 percent of other Christians share this view.
In the Third World, by contrast, this conviction is also very common among
non- Pentecostal Christians.
One might interpret this as evidence that despite widespread public religios-
ity in the United States, secularization has left a deeper mark on Christians
there than in Brazil and Nigeria. Once again, a picture emerges of significantly
better cultural conditions for the reception of Pentecostalism's special features
in the Third World than in richer countries, particularly in the context of daily
life. Pentecostals can easily build on these conditions since they spell out impli-
cations for conduct in most areas of life that stem from being aware of God as a
constant presence in one's life. Pentecostals generally tend to feel a strong influ-
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ence of their religiosity on coping with illness (M : 4.48) and life crises (M :4.77),
along with child-rearing and paid work.
Here, too, the differences between Pentecostals and other Christians are less
pronounced in the Third World than in the United States. Belief in God's direct
intervention in illness and its expression in faith healing has been one of Pen-
tecostalism's defining features since its inception-and one of its main points
of conflict with the rest of American Protestantism. But precisely this praxis
renders it highly compatible with the cultural conditions of many Third World
countries, especially in Africa, where it is considered plausible that people
can be healed by God's power, either through an intermediary or directly. This
does not mean that the Aladura churches in Nigeria, for example, translate
African rites directly into their practices, as has been repeatedly argued. More
likely, this expresses a functional equivalence that can result in Pentecostal
churches becoming strong competitors to traditional healers. Whether that
actually occurs depends partly on contextual factors, in my judgment. There
were fìerce confrontations in Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s between Pente-
costal churches and adherents of Afro-American religions, which are still pefpe-
tuated today in the harsh polemics of the IURD. On the other hand, some
believers also practice multiple religions or-as in a case I am familiar with in
Cuba-Pentecostal worship services may deliberately integrate Afro-American
healing rites.
Despite all local and type-specifìc distinctions, the Pentecostal movement has
in common that it reacts to crisis situations in particular ways and is viewed as
especially competent in such situations. That should come es no surprise, since
similar movements in the history of Christianity-such as the Montanists, |oa-
chimites, Thomas Müntzer's Reformation, and the Anabaptists-also stood out
as crisis religions.
Conversely, an "Evangelicalization" of piety has been observed in the Pente-
costalism of America's solid middle class (such as the AoG), and its enthusiastic
elements have almost completely disappeared. In those places where the Pente-
costal movement (still) has the dynamic of a crisis-based religion, it deals with
illness, life crises, and social crises religiously and theologically rather than
socially or therapeutically. Pentecostals interpret crises large and small with
highly idiosyncratic theological paradigms that are scarcely acknowledged or
known in Europe. They thus present primarily religlous solution strategies to
their adherents and put them under pressure with demands for religious deci-
sions and actions. One cannot understand the Pentecostal movement if the
inner dynamic of its religious logic remains unintelligible-for the simple rea-
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son that this logic is extremely relevant to its adherents' actions, even across the
boundaries of different fields of praxis.
Religious-symbolic processing of time and space
Structuring the experience of social time and social space is among the most im-
portant functions of religious and other "worldview" systems of praxis. This work
of structuring spawns identities and strategies. Socially learned and thus modifi-
able dispositions are decisive for the cognitive, affective and corporeal processes
that such structuring comprises. Actors' dispositions allow them to interpret
their experiences immediately as they are perceived and fìgure out how to react
appropriately.
An especially signifìcant aspect of religious belief is that it promises rescue,
redemption and liberation in the face of negative experiences-especially threats
to life itself and to one's way of life (see also Riesebrodt 2007, schäfer 2005). pen-
tecostalism's main religious metaphors for this are empowerment through the
Holy Spirit, the ability to speak in tongues inspired by the Spirit (glossolalia),
salvation through the Rapture just before the end of the world, and ascetic
detachment from the world through a life of holiness.
These varied expectations of salvation are each linked to specific social situa-
tions and to churches' self-understandings. Pentecostals who focus on empower-
ment by the Holy Spirit (and who ritually foreground this in their worship services,
for example) often see themselves as individuals endowed with power who can con-
front perceived threats in public or private life with the fulI authority of the Spirit.
Those who await the Rapture view themselves as a community preparing for
this event and keep their distance from "the world." Those with the gift of tongues
see themselves es custodians of truth in a treacherous world. These different
self-understandings also correspond to the different ways believers position them-
selves in the religious field and in the broader social space along with matching
their different religious identities. These identities, in turn, prompt specifìc strat-
egies in the context of eústing opporhrnities and constraints. A church prepar-
ing for the Rapture will attribute negative developments in social or family life to
the general deterioration of conditions in the last days. It will thus forgo all
efforts toward social improvement and at most seek to stabilize the congregation
and its families.
Believers authorized by the Spirit will try to deploy their authority against the
evil they perceive, though here, too, the choice of strategies will ultimately depend
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on the purported causes of the evil. Those who attribute problems-bulimia,
say-to secular causes will turn to medication or a psychologist; those who
attribute them to demonic influence will use their divine authority for exorcism.
Those who have learned to articulate themselves in accord with "God's truth"
through speaking in tongues will more inclined to dare to protest against social
problems. Al1 three of these exampies make apparent that religious identities
and strategies tend to colrespond to peopie's social circumstances. These three
different types of identity thus correspond more or less precisely to the three
types of Pentecostal community-building outlined above.
It is clear that the variety of Pentecostal praxis cannot be exhausted by either
examples or typologies. But in accord with the data on the intensity of religious
life, they at least make evident how imporlant Pentecostals' various religious
convictions are to them in coping with the demands of social life. Religious dis-
positions that regulate perception, judgment and action aliow individuals within
their church communities to interpret and evaluate their experiences in every
dimension of the social world in a specific religious mannel. On this basis they
develop strategies that always differ somewhat from the conventional strategies
in their social environment-just enough so that Pentecostals can be linked to
them while also seüing themselves aparl-because they are operating with
schemes of interpretation and action that are specifically religious (i.e., refer to
transcendence).
When one cannot fall back on basic sociodemographic data-as is the case
with the Religion Monitor's data-but has good data on religious convictions
and practices, it makes sense to interpret the material according to two funda-
mental categories of experience: the question of how religious actors cognitively
(and at the same time, affectively) organize their experience of social time and
social space. Which religious dispositions are available to them, and how are
they applied in ordering experiences of space and timel
The Religion Monitor offers some variables that go back to very old religious
models of cognitive and affective conceptions of space and time: the quesiion of
the world's future-that is, the infìnite or fìnite nature of time; and the question
of the division of social and thus also symbolic space into good and evìl-that is,
the influence of divine and demonic powers.
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Time
If one asks how time is cognitively organized, Pentecostalism offers a radicalized
version of an evolutionary,linear conception of time. This corresponds to an im-
portant current in the Christian tradition. Christianity began as an apocalyptic reli
gion and was thus defined by the idea of linear time converging on an endpoint.
During late antiquity, however, this approach was supplanted by the idea of an eter-
nal parallelism between heaven and earth. Historically, the apocalyptic current in
christianity has been repeatedly revived in times of crisis and "from below." It has
often been linked to revolution and social reform, but often also to strategies of
"fleeing the world" and retreating into "sects" in times of crisis. In any case, the
early Pentecostal movement followed the apocalyptic tradition by way of American
evangelicalism, carried the conflicts over the theory of evolution in its immediate
historical "baggage," and initially espoused an apolitical form of apocalyptic
thought focused on believers withdrawing from the world (premillenarianism).
This conception of time very closely matches the dynamics of a capitalist
economy as perceived by marginalized sections of the population. In the course
of the 20th century, parts of the American neo-Pentecostal movement trans-
formed apocalyptic thought into a form that outright demanded the reshaping of
society (postmillenarianism). However, the classic Pentecostal missions exported
premillenarianism, and most churches in the Third world initially adopted it. In
some of those churches these ideas continue to shape their identities. In others,
though-for example, in Brazil-they seem to have become "sedimented sym-
bols" (Ricoeur) that have lost their significance for identity formation.
In asking Pentecostals about this complex of topics, it is advisable to tap into
the eschatological tradition. The question of whether the end of the world is
imminent foregrounds the respondents' experience of time, particularly with
rcgard to apocalyptic notions of the course of time. Do respondents conceive of
time as potentially endless and therefore base their religious beliefs on the paral-
lelism of earth and heaven, time and eternity, as well as on the idea of the soul's
immortalityl or do they see time as progressing linearly toward the end of the
world and await it with varying degrees of urgency, foreseeing battles ahead and
putting their faith in a new creation)
The question of whether the end of the world is imminent allows us to
roughly assess the direction of the respondents' thinking. our hypothesis was
that Pentecostals would be significantly more likely than other Christians to
agree that the end of the world is near. This hypothesis was impressively confirmed
in the united States. It was just as impressively refuted in Nigeria. whereas pen-
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Figure 4: End of the world nearing, agree/disagree
Disag ree
! Non-pentecostals Bl Pentecostals All data ìn percent
tecostals' apocalyptic beliefs set them apart from other Christians in the United
States, in Nigeria nearly all Christians (and Muslims) believe in the apocalypse.
In addition, in the United States there is a significantly stronger correlation
l¡etween Pentecostals' belief in the imminent end of the world and the opinion
that their religiosity affects their political views. How should these findings be
interpretedl
In the United States, Pentecostals believe significantly more strongly than
other Christians that the end of the world is near (Pentecostals:97 %", upper two
[based on a five-point scale : u.t.], M: 7.34; other Christians: 32 /", u.1., M :
3.38; :margin of error p 1.000; see Figure 4). There is absolutely no disagreement
among Pentecostals with this statement (0 %, lower two [: 1.t.]), whereas almost
one-half of other Christians reject rI (47 %,1i.).
While Pentecostals in the United States demonstrate homogeneíty in their
belief that the end of the world is near (SD = .53; see Figure 5), other Christians
express a diversity of views on the subject (SD = 1.48). If we look separately at
Catholics, Protestants (including the Evangelicals) and Pentecostals, we see a cer-
tain polarization of the field. Catholics and mainline Protestants make up the
majority of those who disagree strongly that the end of the world is near, while
Pentecostals and (presumably Evangelical) Proiestants number high among
those who believe it is at hand.
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Figure 5: Believe that the end of the world is near-United States
Catholics Protestants (incl. Evangelicals) Pentecostals (incl. Charismatics)
! Totally agree I Tend to agree D Have no definite opinion tr Tend to disagree ! Totally disagree
All data in percent
These data point to long-running eschatological disputes that are closely associ-
ated with the debate over fundamentalism. With their apocalyptic and funda-
mentalist tendencies, Pentecostals and Evangelicals have distanced themselves
from mainline Protestantism and Catholics. Clearly, compared to the total num-
ber of Christians, believers in the imminent end of the world are a minority,
albeit an impressive one (33 %, u.I.l, against those who reject it (50%,1.t.¡. How-
ever, this is a highly active minority.
Since the revival of the American fundamentalist movement in the late
1970s, their activities have become ever more tightly integrated into conserva-
tives' strategies in the culture wars. This also corresponds with the strong politi-
cization of religious positions among American Pentecostals. The data show
Pentecostals attributing a greater degree of religious influence on their political
attitudes than other Christians (question 14.5), even if they consider politics a
relatively unimportant aspect of their life (question 1.5).
There is also a clear correlation between eschatological ideation and the influ-
ence of religiosity on political attitudes (cluestions 74.5 and 1.6.7 , corcelation r :
.303). In fact, apocalyptic Pentecostals-and more precisely, neo-Pentecostals-
have played key roles in mobilizing the Christian right: as activists, as a political
base, and as Republican voters.
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Views on how the end of the world wiil transpire have undergone several
changes in this process. Those who believe in the Rapfure-the traditional pre-
millenarian teaching that God will rescue the faithful from the Earth before
Armageddon-are difficult to mobilize politically. In the interest of mobiliza-
tion, however, the Left Behind series and Restorationism have (each in their own
way) brought Armageddon into believers' purview of action. Political teachings
on the end of the world have been further radicalized by theories of demonic
activity (see below).
The landscape of beliefs in Brazll is less polarized. While fewer Pentecostals
believe that the end of the world is near (76%,u.t.), a greater pelcentage of other
Christians do (39 %o,u.¡.: see Figure 4). There is nevertheless a significant differ-
ence between the two groups on the issue (questíon 76.7: Pentecostals M: 2.03,
others: M:3.32). All confessions show a large degree of heterogeneity in their
views (Pentecostals: sD = 7.47, other Christians: sD = 7.77).As in the United
States, we see polarization in Brazil between the Pentecostals and Evangelicals-
who tend to believe in the apocaiypse-and Catholics and Protestants, who gen-
erally do not (see Figure 6).
The hierarchy and traditions of Brazilian Catholicism and Brazil's relatively
strong Lutheran Church are unlikely to be influenced by apocalyptic teachings.
Figure 6: Believe that the end of the worltl is tlear-Brazil
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However, it is worlh noting that 19 percent of Catholics in BraztT believe that the
end of the world is near, whereas 14 percent of the country's Pentecostals do not.
This segment of Catholics are likely to be Catholic-Charismatic Christians who
are competing with independent Pentecostal churches for members among the
lower socioeconomic classes in the slums.
The data, including a very sma11 sample of Charismatics (n: 19), support at
least an educated guess about the non-eschatological Pentecostals. The Charis-
matics in the sample believe significantly less in the end of the world than do
the Pentecostals (M:3.38 in contrastto M:1.56). Of the Charismatics,53 per-
cent (1.t.) do not believe the end of the world is imminent (and because of how
the data set is broken down, they are by definition not Catholics). These individ-
uals are likely to be committed neo-Pentecostals, such as those in the IURD,
who are more concerned with this-worldly exorcism strategies. In addition, one
suspects that while more than a few Brazilian Pentecostals are nominally famil-
iar with eschatological expectations, they grant them only a marginal place in
the network of their religious convictions. A low-level functionary in the IPDA
whom I interviewed went on at length about all sorts of miracles and magic; but
he addressed the topic of the end times only when questioned specifically about
it, and then in a detached way, as if reciting a catechism.
The findings thus mainly indicate that religiosity in Brazil is highly pluralis-
tic and competitive. The religious symbolism of eschatological expectations
seems to have only minor significance. This may have a variety of causes. Meas-
ured against the historical emergence of millenarian expectations, the Brazilian
context is different in that there is neither an abrupt, widespread experience of
crisis, nor are social conflicts being carried out (though the latter is due to strong
state hegemony and a lack of organized political actors, not because there are no
cleavages).
The question of social survival is being decided not through political con-
flicts-as in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s-but through the ability
to find a niche in the system or a good position for social advancement. Thís
social context renders Brazil's second distinctive feature relevant: the strong
influence of magic in public consciousness. But magic is the strategy of the sor-
cerer, not the prophet, so to speak. Revolutionary political action is not on the
menu. In lieu of a prospect of revolution, individuals develop strategies to deal
with Brazil's ubiquitous corruption. Magic is competent in this realm, and the
combination of religion and money can lend magical attributes to the latter.
It is thus understandable that Brazil's Pentecostals stand out no more than
other Christians when it comes to politics and that the views of all the groups
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Figure 7: Believe that the end of the worlcl is near-lrligeria
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surveyed are all over the map. Again, there is great plurality in the field; a first
glance at the statistics does not show confessionally specific differences in politi-
cal attitudes. In any event, one cannot speak of eschatological political mobiliza-
tion of religious actors in BrazlI. Of course, this does not mean that neo-Pente-
costal magicians of wealth-such as Edir Macedo, the bishop of the IURD-do
not exercise major influence on the country's political decision-makers.
In Nigeria, the situation is again different than in Brazil and the United
States. Nearly all Nigerian Christians believe the end of the world is near (89%
of Pentecostals and 84% of others, u.t.; see Figure 4). If we differentiate more
finely among the groups, we see significantly fewer Protestants who agree with
this statement $7 %) than Pentecostals (70 %") or Calholics (69 %"; see Figure 7).
The 1ow number of non-Pentecostal Protestants expressing this view is likely
linked to the decidedly non-apocalyptic influence of the older Methodist, Presby-
terian and Baptist missionary churches. The uncommonly high number of Cath-
olics agreeing with this statement is presumably due to the Catholic charismatic
movement's strong influence.
All in all, Nigerian Chrisiianity is strongly shaped by eschatological expecta-
tions but not necessarily political as a result. To ascertain how political this
eschatology is, one can look for a statistical correlation. But it is impossible to
demonstrate any such correlation between expecting the imminent end of the
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Figure 8: Ëschatological views in Christianity and lslam-Nigeria
@ Totally disagree I Tend to disagree E Have no definite opinion I Tend to agree I Totally agree
All data in percent
world (ques¡on 1,6.7; see Figure 8) and the impact of religiosity on political views
(question 14.5).
One should thus avoid hypothesizing any sort of politically charged apocalyp-
tic thought in Nigeria. However, Nigerian Christians have very diverse percep-
tions of the significance of "politics" as an aspect of one's life (question 1.5, SD =
1.56, see Figures 9 and 19. Responses show a clear polarization between those
who consider politics only somewhat important (41%,1.t.) and those who con-
sider it important (43%, u.t.). Here we must again differentiate further. The
apocalyptic time scheme can be transformed in different ways, depending on
one's view of politics and one's options for action. It can either legitimize retreet
from worldly conflicts (premillenarianism) or be transformed into a combative
ideology (postmillenarianism). Experiences in the United States and Latin Amer-
ica show that only groups with relatively good prospects for action are inclined to
develop postmillenarian battle scenarios.
In Nigeria, it is mainly neo-Pentecostal groups focused on the upper middle
class that could fit this bill. However, such tendencies do not appear to be wide-
spread. Given its great power, the RCCG would seem e particularly likely candi
date. But it seems to have merely transformed its premillenarianism in such a
s/ay as to legitimate its intensive mission work: Before the end comes, the Gos-
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pel (and the church) must be spread everywhere. Its claim to power is thus lim-
ited to the religious field for now.
This is where Islam becomes a salient issue in Nrgeria. Compared to Christi-
ans as a whole, Muslim respondents are significantly (p <.000) more likely to
expect their religion to influence their political views (Figure 9). But this in itself
does not demonstrate strong politicization, because even this significantly stron-
ger "yes" still fal1s only between "moderately" and "quite a bit" (M :3.44).
But for Muslims, too, scatter (SD = 1.55) and polarization are considerable. A
rather large group that considers religion to be highly important to politics (38%)
is pitted against the 19 percent of respondents who relect this decisively. Only the
former group is likely to be easily mobilized religiously.
If one scrutinizes the Muslim respondents for their apocalyptic tendencies,
Islam appears similarly apocalyptic as Christianity in Nigeria (Figure 8). One
should note, however, that Islamic teachings strongly stress the Final Judgment
as a disciplinary element without implying apocalyptic (and hence temporal)
urgency. Muslims' responses can thus definitely be interpreted as expressing
conformity to the traditional content of teachings.
As one might expect, looking at the connection between belief in the end
times and politics yields no correlation (r: 0.026). As for Christianity, these data
caution against assuming that Nigerian Muslims can be broadly mobilized
through eschatology. However, they also contain clear indications of a politically
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active minority that is not insignificant. This minorif nay well be open to the
influence ofa recent spate ofapocalyptic gray literature that has for the past few
decades been radicalizing the Islamic belief in the Second Coming with Chris-
tian embellishments. Nigeria is thus split between two profoundly eschatological
religions. Whether this focus on eschatology turns into a rejection of politics or
to politicai fanaticism depends very much on how much pressure crises place on
actors and on their scope of action. However, it seems as though religious atti-
tudes and thus eschatological expectations are much more strongly based on
everyday experiences and life crises.
A comparison of the eschatological orientation of American Pentecostals with
those in Nigeria and BrazlT reveals that the decisive difference is the obvious
politicization of Pentecostal apocalyptic thought in the United States. In the early
years of the Pentecostal movement-with the poverty of urban slums, racial dis-
crimination, and the impact of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake-a lively hope
for the end times sti11 made sense, given the hell that was everyday life. With the
increasing embourgeoisement of Pentecostalism, views on end-times scenarios
became more a matter of academic disputes and an ecclesiastical test of orthodoxy.
Having become uprooted in this way, apocalyptic thought has found a socially rel-
evant place again only in the last 20 years, facilitated by inihatives from the neo-
Pentecostal camp: the religious interpretation of a globai superpower's situation
on various fronts. This has tumed apocal;.ptic attitudes into weapons in a bit-
ter ideological battle in the United States. In Third World countries, the main
function of Pentecostal eschatological expectations is to help people survive their
everyday lives in dignity. This difference between political and quotidian rele-
vance can also be observed in the religious constrrrction of social space.
Space
Examining the religious organization of space also places us within the terrain
of a long-standing religious tradition. The classic religious distinction between
the sacred and the profane, which Durkheim emphasized, stmctures space in a
specific way, as does the ethicaÌ difference between good and evil. According to
the strucluralist tradition, establishing difference is the basis for the creation of
any sorl of social organization, or as Luhmann puts it, "social systems."
This is also true for religiously established differences. Like every other reli-
gious system, the Christian tradition works to establish differences that simulta-
neously classify and value social space: sacred versus profane, priest versus lay-
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person, church versus the world, saved versus damned, and so on. Based on
these self-evident distinctions, a highly complex, highly differentiated symbolic
and social space constilutes itself in every religion, which is shaped by power
relations.
The symbolic act of recognrzing cognitively perceived differences amounts to
the creation of social boundaries. Such differences structure actors' perceptions,
judgments, and action, and this, conversely, structures social space. It is thus
decisive which terms and symbols a religious community draws on in establish-
ing primary differences.
Their practical connotations determine the validity, range, and impact of dif-
ferences, with the overall context of how important religion is to the actors. We
mustthus take note of a number of consequences. The first is immediately evi-
dent: the connotative scope of the symbols themselves. The difference "church
versus world," for example, tends to connote a relationship of static, institutional
delimitation; the difference "spirit versus demon," by contrast, connotes active
antagonism; and the difference "priest versus layperson" connotes a relation of
hierarchrcal subordination.
The establishment of symbolic religious difference then results in the actua1
creation even of religious actors. For example, only where the difference "spirit/
God versus demon" is recognized and thus socially meaningful can the job of an
exorcist be invented. This immediately highlights a third consequence: Actors
take action in contexts that are marked by competition with other actors, on the
one hand, and by various sorts of power relations, on the other. The cognitive
and social creation of fields of aciivity by establishing symbolic religious differ-
ences is thus also highly relevant for the construction of believers' "cognitive and
affective rnapi'for the religious community's internal organization, and for their
social strategies.
To draw out a specifically Pentecostal distinction in the cognitive organization
of social space-and one that is highly topical, to boot-one must examine the
difference between the Holy Spirit and demons. Since ihe movement's incep-
tion, this difference has played a key role in Pentecostalism, When the Holy Spi-
rit reveals itself in glossolalia, this is not simply a theological version of art for
ar1's sake. In the religious field, glossolalia distinguishes Pentecostalism from
the holiness movement and the rest of evangelism and thus helps Pentecostals
find their identity. And in the everyday life of marginalized believers, the power
of the Spirit experienced in glossolalia and ecstasy helps them confront threaten-
ing powers-demons, illness, alcoholism, poverty-just as Jesus did, according
to the Gospels.
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The motif of exorcism became established early on (much to the annoyance
of rationalistic Evangelicalism), particularly in the context of healing the sick. Ill-
ness was believed to be caused by demons, and those demons were driven out.
With the social advancement of many white Pentecostal churches in the United
States, exorcism lost its significance in the middle class for some time. Neo-Pen-
tecostalism has revived the practice, but now it is aimed at politics and the econ'
omy and no longer at (mental) illness.
In the Third World, exorcism is widespread in the poor churches in connec-
tion with health problems; in the middle class, it is more often coupled with the
quest for economic opporhrnities. As the economic fìeld has grown increasingly
individualized and monetized throughout the world, since the 1990s, the trend
in Pentecostal churches-especially in neo-Pentecostal ones-has been to
increasingly link the promise of prosperity with demonological magic.
The so-called prosperity gospel goes back to L9th century American magical
and spiritualist thought (Phineas Quimby). During the 20th century, Kenneth
Hagin did more than anyone to spread it in the neo-Pentecostal movement. This
word of faith "theology" is based on the belief that one can actually come to pos-
sess something simply by laying claim to it. The means to this a belief in God's
efÏìcacy that is expressed through donations to religious communities, for which
God will reward the donor "one-hundred-fold" in pecuniary terms.
Along with its many other implications, this monetary faith also raises the
believer's aìvareness of another distinction in social space: the economic divide
between rich and poor. It thus deals with class contradictions, which are virLually
impossible to ignore from above or below in Third World countries. At the same
time, it propagates the idea of individual advancement and of the church and
God as brokers of upward mobility. The Religion Monitor does emphasize demons
and evil, but unfortunately it does not give us access to the problem of the pros-
perity gospel.
If we now turn to the statistical aspects of the belief in demons, one overarch-
ing obsewation should be made fìrst. The United States seems to have a clearly
definable cluster of respondents whose belief in the efÍìcacy of demons is impor-
tant for the rest of their religious and social praxis, while belief in demons is
rather diffusely distributed in Third World countries and seems to have little sig-
nifìcance for other attitudes.
An overview of how strongly belief in the efïìcacy of demons correlates with
other attitudes (all other valid variables) among the Christian respondents shows
that strong correlations are much more numerous in the United States (ranging
up to r : 0.676) than in Brazil (maximum r : 0.226, with other values much
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lower) or Nigeria (basically no correlation). Opinions on the efficacy of demons
vary widely among all respondents (and not just due to outliers: U.S.: SD = 7.48:
Brazil and Nigeria: SD approximately 1.61), with the mean for belief in demons
slightly lower in the United States (M : 2.56; BraziT and Nigeria: M approxi-
mately 2.90).
This difference between the United States and the other two countries may
be due to a country-specific difference in the interview situation. But if this is
not the case, I can only propose a hypothesis that I will further explore when
analyzing the individual countries: In the United States, belief in spirits is a
(fairly new) peculiarity of neo-Pentecostalism, in particular, and does not have
roots in a widespread popular tradition. This makes it more visible and gives it
greater specific influence on other attitudes for these believers. In Brazìl and
especially in Nigeria, belief in the efficacy of spirits is not particular to Pentecos-
taiism but rather widespread. It is so taken for granted by Pentecostals that they
do not endow it with any special meaning for other areas of their lives-which
does not mean, however, that exorcism is not part of daily life. In addition, it is
highly likely that the associations with the notion of "demon" are quite different
in the three countries.
First, a glance at the United States. It is likely that the high specific correla-
tion there between belief in demons and belìevers' other attitudes is because the
FigLrre 10: Belief irr dernons-U5A
Cathol ics Protestants (incl. Evangelicals) Pentecostals (incl Charismatics)
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belief in demons and spirits has hardly any cultural roots in the United States
and has become visible only through Pentecostal churches. (Spiritualism, which
has been present since the 19th century, has been a fringe phenomenon in the
middle class.) In line with this, and in terms of the centrality of religion, belief
in demons is "very" strong among 26 percent of the highly religious (M:3.02,
SD = 1.50), while the moderateþ religious have "little" belief (M : 1.89, SD =
1.03), and the non-religious overwhelmingly reject it (M : 1.20, SD = 0.49).
This subgroup of the highly religious almost certainly belongs to neo-Pente-
costal communities. This is further supported by the fact that only among U.S.-
American Pentecostals is the belief in demons highly homogenous (M: 4.47,
SD = 0.67, see Figure 10). A strong correlation is plausible for these believers:
The stronger the belief in demons, the more pronounced various other religious
beliefs will be, such as the perceived importance of religion for other areas of life
(question 14). This clearþ sets Pentecostals' opinions apart from those of other
Christian and non-Christian Americans.
One finds the same difference between Pentecostals and non-Pentecostals
when one asks about the efficacy of "supernatural powers" (Figure L1). The non-
Pentecostal respondents are strfüngly less likely than Pentecostals to count on
the efficacy of supernatural powers; Pentecostals, by contrast, are apparently
unable to imagine a world without the supematural.
Figure 11: Belief in supernatural powers-United States
Catholics Protestants (incl. Evangelicals) Pentecostals (incl. Charismatics)
E Not at all I Not very E Moderately I Quite a bit E Very much so All data in percent
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This clear difference between Pentecostals, other Protestants, and Catholics
repeats itself on a highly significant ievel for all variables relevant to our topic:
the efficacy of angels and guarding against evil, as well as the battle against evil
(questions 73.1,4, 76.1.0, and 16.13). Here, Pentecostal responses are consistently
quite homogenous (SD ranging from 0.46 to 0.95), while those of the other
Christians are defìnitely more widely distributed (SD ranging from1.26 to 1.48).
This again indicates how strongly (neo-)Pentecostals cultivate their belief in de-
mons as a separate discourse. This, in turns, reflects the clear polarization of
respondents on all the relevant questions, as on the question of belief in demons
itself (Figure 10).
Underlying this polarization is an important dichotomy in the cognitive con-
stmction of social space. The Pentecostal distinction between good and evil
metaphysical powers tends not to be shared by the partly secularized, part7y
rationalist religious public (be they mainstream Protestants or Catholics). This
notion is generally specific to (neo-)Pentecostal groups.
Yet is it still surprising, at first glance, rhal 22 percent of the Protestants sur-
veyed (including Evangelicals) expressed a very strong belief in the effìcacy of
demons. This is particularly surprisingly because this topic was the stuff of
intense controversy between Evangelicals and Pentecostals in the early 20th cen-
tury. Our findings likely indicate a more or less graduai "charismaticization" of
the religious field that has accompanied the third wave. This third wave of Pente-
costal activity-following classic Pentecostalism and then the neo-Pentecostal
andf or Charismatic movement-has popularized neo-Pentecostal ideas of spiri-
tual warfare among adherents of Evangehcal churches, such as Baptists.
The doctrine of spiritual warfare, in particular, defines the terrain of demon-
ology. Since the 1970s, the neo-Pentecostal movement has fleshed out this
notion of a cosmic struggle between heavenly and satanic hosts and applied it to
a burgeoning number of areas of individual and social life. It places such things
as the healing of physical and psychological infirmities-in the tradition of clas-
sic Pentecostalism-in an elaborate cosmic context. It contributes to authoritar-
ian stmctures within the church (for example, in the "discipleship movement")
by blaming demonic influence for disobedience toward leaders. It interprets the
propagation of one's own faith through missions at home and abroad as a battle
against the powers of darkness. It also interprets economic success and failure
by attributing the latter to demonic influence and the former to spiritually guided
good management.
Finally, an intensifìed but widespread version of the doctrine has become
established-the teaching of "territorial spirits" (C. P. Wagner)-which is a politi
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cal and geostrategic variant. It holds that entire territories (cities, nations, and
major geographic regions) may be controlled by demonic princes and can only be
liberated through spiritual warfare. The metaphor of "spiritual warfare" takes on a
direct political relevance here, yet it retains its ambivalence because it has so many
possible connotations (see also the clear correlation of r: .396 between belief in
demons and the relevance of religion for political attitudes, questions 13.13 and
14.5). It is interpreted to mean either that political conflicts should be carried out
spintuølly and not militarily----or that political opponents are Satan's agents, which
justifies all means of exterminating them, including war. Accordingly, this teach-
ing is evoked-implicitly and explicitly-time and again by radicals of the Chris-
tian Right in the United States and also in Guatemala. To some extent, this is a
genuine contribution of the neo-Pentecostal movement to fundamentalism.
All in all, a politicized religiosity that is highly stmctured by ideology is evi-
dent in the structuring ofsocial space, too, especially for the neo-Pentecostal cur-
rent. This is unsurprising insofar as one term in this distinction-evil spirits-
and the magic associated with it scarcely have a social place in rationalistic, Prot-
estant American culture. Belief in demons is thus something special, on the one
hand; on the other, the public consciousness does not anchor it in specific fields
of praxis (such as healing, death rituals, agrarian rnagrc, etc.). While this limits
such religious conviction to a relatively small circle of believers, at the same time
it holds opporh-rnities for activists to extend the demon model to highly varied
areas of modern life (such as finance, politics, and war) and to apply it in highly
visible ways. The media power of television preachers who do this gradually con-
tributes to the spread of such thinking in the population.
In BraztT, belief in demons relates more strongly to everyday life and to com-
petition in the religious field. First, Brazilian Pentecostals agree significantly less
often (0.50 points on the scale) with the relevant questions (on supernatural
powers, the efficacy of demons and angels, guarding against evil, and the battle
against evil) than their American counterparts, especially on the question on
demons. This confirms our previous comparative observation that belief in
demons scarcely correlates with other variables in Brazil.
Brazilian Pentecostals (and neo-Pentecostals) thus tend to be less resolute
and probably do not have such authoritatively defìned concepts as Americans.
The first point is evidenced by the lack of a signifìcant difference (on average)
between Pentecostal and Evangelical views. In addition, Pentecostals' opinions
on every relevant question are quite widely scattered (SD ofabout 1.30) and are
thus far less homogenous than in the United States. The field is in fact polarized
here, too (Figure 12), but in a different way.
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Figure 12: Belief in demons-Brazil
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In the United States, Pentecostals cohesively tend to believe in demons, Cath-
olics lean clearly against it, and other Protestants follow a more or less normal
distribution. In Brazil, on the other hand, polarization is evident to some degree
within every group. Overall, this indicates less homogenization and more inter-
nal pluralism within individual clusters of actors in the religious field. In addi-
tion, several more-detailed observations can be made: As in the United States,
belief in demons is clearly rejected by parts of the Catholic Church (presumably
those that are traditional and hierarchical but also marked by Vatican II). The
percentage of Catholics who believe in demons is larger than in the United
States, however. These are likely members of the Catholic charismatic move-
ment. It is further striking that many Pentecostals reject belief in demons (2I%\
and a good many Evangelicals subscribe to it (51%).The Evangelicals are prob-
ably showing the third wave effect already described for the United States. Even
Baptists and Methodists practice power evangelism and spiritual warfare.
The Pentecostal skeptics are mostly likely adherents of classic Pentecostal
churches (such as Assembléias de Deus, AdD) and small, independent congrega-
tions that are involved in social reform and that reject the social and political
abuse of belief in demons. Pentecostals who believe in demons are probably
mostly adherents of neo-Pentecostal churches. In the IURD and IPDA, for exam-
ple, noisy exorcisms belong to the daily rituals, and the churches' overall per-
formance is unthinkable without them.
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In these churches, the belief in demons and exorcism fìnds highly visible
applications in prosperity magic. Brazil's economic and social development dur-
ing the past 20 years of neoJiberal stmchrral adjustment has caused grave hard-
ships for the middle class while making advancement to the middle-class status
a downright utopian goal for the lower class.
In this context, churches like the IURD or IPDA promote among their adher-
ents the middle class economic trinity as an idealized vision of divine blessing:
"caffo, casa, loja" (car, house, business). Poverty's persistance is blamed on the
effects of (often Afro-American) demons. Preachers promise that with a dona-
tion generous enough to avoid offending God-which can easily exceed the tra-
ditional tithe, amounting to L0 percent of income-He can be persuaded to give
the preachers and their assistants the power they need to drive demons out of
worshipers, thus opening the path to prosperity for them.
This has a dual effect of prosperity for the church. First, it receives donations
that add up to impressive millions annually. (One sees believers actually putting
large bills into the collection envelopes!) Second, believers are kept dependent
on the exorcists, for it is the exorcists and not the believers who are empowered
by the spirit (and by the donations).
In this way, the separation of social space between an economic top and bottom
becomes dosely associated with a religious separation between God and demons.
Figure 13: lmportant to remain on guard against evil-Brazil
100 r
Catholics Protestants (incl. Evangelicals) Pentecostals (incl. Charismatics)
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All data in percent
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Unlike in many smal1, independent Pentecostal churches, the practical logic of the
neo-Pentecostal megachurches never lets believers cross from the side of demons
through the liminal space of doubt over to the side of authoritative individual
empowerrnent by the Holy Spirit. Instead, in this discourse the effects of the Holy
Spirit are closely tied to church officials, which further divides institutional church
space into a powerful good "top" and a powerless "bottom" suspected of demons.
Finally, the operative principle of this praxis is based on the logic of a magically
interpreted "do ut des" in the relationship between the believer and God.
In Brazil's everyday life, magic determines the most important context for
practicing a belief in demons. Evil and its containment is a commonplace topic.
The fact that many Brazifian Chrrstians seem to have only vague notions about
demons and the like is probably due to the widespread and thus highly diverse
discourse on evil and how to fight it in Brazil's folk Catholicism and its Afro-
American religions.
VigiÌance against evil (in its many forms) is routine for nearly all religious
people ìn Brazil (Figure 13) and focuses on life's everyday adversities. It is com-
piemented by magical protection from evil, whether through neo-Pentecostal
exorcism, consuming the host in Catholic Communion, Umbanda purification
rites and the blessing "sarabâ," the invisible Exú of Candomblé as a companion
on the street, a Macumba fetish under the doorstep-or through Christian fet-
ishes, when for example IURD members are supposed to guard against evil by
attaching "holy bread" to the back of their front door and then burning it ritually,
and evil along with it, in worship services the next week.
In Nigeria, too, the assumption that demons are active in the world is by no
means confined to Pentecostals (Figure 14), as was the case for the United States.
Neither belief in demons (question 13m) nor belief in supernatural powers has
any appreciable correlation with other attitudes such as the significance of religion
for various areas of life (question 14).
In ihe United States it was clear that the stronger the belief in demons, the
more important religion was to many areas of iife. This correlation is virtually
absent in Nigeria. Accordingly, while over 90 percent of respondents in Nigeria
are highly religious and consider religion very meaningful in their iives, most do
not believe "very much" in the efficacy of demonic powers (only 31 %" withM:
3.05 and SD = 1.64). This result is vexing because it is not consistent with the
importance attributed to the actions of evils spirits in African societies, which is
backed by much evidence both scholarly and practical.
A distinctly different picture emerges, however, when one asks generally
about the effects of supernatural powers (cluestion 13k). This reveals that about
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Figure 14: Belief in demons-Nigeria
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Figure 15: Belief in supernatural powers-N¡geria
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half of all Evangelical and Pentecostal respondents believe "very" strongly in the
action of supernalural powers; the rest of the sample is strongly scattered (M :
3.97, SD = 7.29, see Figure 15. These findings match the situation documented
elsewhere for Africa.
How, then, can we explain the distribution of answers to the cluestion on the
efficacy of demons (Figure 14)l First, this belief is by no means peculiar to the
Pentecostal or neo-Pentecostal movements (as in the United States); it is also
common among Cathoiics, though to a lesser extent. This fits the assumption
that belief in spirits is a widespread notion in folk religion that adherents of
Christian churches may be perpetuating in a transformed manner. The wide var-
iation within Pentecostaiism admittedly remains a problem. The finding that
some members of African Pentecostal churches totally reject the effìcacy of the
devil and his minions (27 %o rcsponded "not at all") contradicts the findings of
every qualitative study that I am aware of. Perhaps the answer lies in the inter-
pretation of the question itself.
As a rule, Pentecostals do not regard questions about demons as questions
about their existence and efficacy as such, which appears self-evident to them.
(The question of whether spirits exist tends to be more widespread among the
historical Protestant mission churches, which generally deny it.) For Pentecos-
ta1s, the question of demons is one of their power, not their existence. Demons
lay claim to power. What limits does the Holy Spirit's counterr¿ailing power
place on this claiml What power can a Pentecostal concede to demonsl How
effective is Jesus' protection)
If respondents interpret the demon cluestion through their prior understanding
of an acute power struggle and moreover relate it to their own lives, it is definitely
possible for them to hear the question as suggesting demons could still have an
impact on their lives and then to answer it in the negative. If this is the case, one
must put the numbers into perspective. The decisive difference between Pentecos-
tals and other Christians would then consist in the way they deølwith spirits.l
If one compares Pentecostals' strategies against evil with those of other
Nigerian Christians, Pentecostals stand out more strongly, as one would expect.
More than all other Christians, they see resistance against evil as a battle. Similar
to the indigenous Latin American population, though with much greater inten-
sity, Christianity in Africa is still engaged in a compiex confrontation with the
continent's ethnic religions. At stake is not just the definition of good and evil
but also the clashing reiigions' right to exist.
In the wake of colonialism, nationalism, and modernizatíon, Christianity has
achieved the much stronger position overa11, to be sure. Nonetheless, older reli-
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gious dispositions persist in the collective habitus. Within certain limits, they are
also publicly orchestrated and legitimized in regionalist and nationalist politics
as tokens of identity. Admittedly, the latent habitual influence of traditional
thinking on everyday action is more important to the symbolic structuring of
social space than is the open competition of institutional representatives in the
religious fìeld.
The various Christian currents resort to different strategies in the battle for
the valid definition of reality. Particularly the old Protestant mission churches
but also orthodox Catholicism represent the exclusivist extreme: They totally
deny the existence of the old religion's spirits and supernatural powers and intro-
duce a modern, Western image of the world. Since the 1960s and 1970s, Protes-
tant and Catholic African theologians have developed an inclusivist extreme:
They have rehabilitated the African tradition by incorporating elements of it into
Christian rites and teaching-for instance, by interpreting Christ as the supreme
ancestor. Neither of these two options has been particularly successful.
The African Instituted Churches-such as the Aladura churches in Nigeria,
the Zion churches of South Africa, and others-have pursued a third stretegy.
Since about the 1930s, they have managed to gain remarkable influence with a
special amalgam of African and Pentecostal praxis. Many of the Pentecostal
churches have adopted a fourth path. Explicitþ distancing themselves from the
AIC, they have developed their own models of mediating-very successfully-
between African tradition and modernity in a dialectical fashion, both denying
them and yet incorporating them into a new synthesis (Aufuebenl.
One special advantage of the Pentecostal strategies is that they informally
draw on traditional African cosmologies while symbolically transforming and
reappraising them. In doing so, they also tackle a dual uncertainty that is wide-
spread in society: cultural and religious ambivalence regarding African culture,
coupled with the rapid transformation of economic patterns of production and
consumption. This has allowed Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches to
respond to the multiplicity of challenges brought by neoJiberal structural trans-
formation since the 1980s. Not for nothing have they experienced an exceptional
upswing during this time. Unlike the rationalism of the mission churches, their
pronounced demonology takes seriously the prevalent vigilance against evil (Fig-
ure 16), and specifìcally the evils that the folk religions guard against: ghosts,
witches, and fetishes.
The Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches fight against evil-with signifì-
cantly more engagement and resolve than historical Protestants (question'J,6m,
Pentecostals M : 1,.2L, SD = 0.592; historical Protestants M : 1..73, SD = 1.01).
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They get the orientation necessary for this fight from the stmcturrng of social
space according to the logic of the so-ca11ed Biblical worldview.
This includes the notion that the cosmos is populated with spirits, which was
already implicitly and unsystematically present in tradrtional Pentecostalism,
and which American neo-Pentecostalism has systematized and rendered explicit.
This teaching elaborates a metaphysics of heavenly and satanic hosts who battle
each other-which is invisible to most humans but perceptible to exorcists and
those endowed with the Spirit. This doctrine combines smoothly with the notion
common in many African cultures that an invisible spirit world exists in parallel
to the visible human world, and that it influences the human world in uncontrol-
lable ways. While the traditional cultures consider this ambivalent and basically
dangerous, requiring containment through periodic rituals, fetishes, and taboos,
the Pentecostals acknowledge it as real but unambiguously evil. This is where
spiritual warfare comes in, positioning the power of the Holy Spirit against
ghosts and demons. The Holy Spirit is regarded as more powerful; it enables
exorcism of evil spirits and purification of the humans, social relationship, and
objects that they possess.
Ecstatic incorporations of the Holy Spirit, the authority of the local pastor, the
congregation, and (to varying degrees) the nuclear family now take the place of
traditional techniclues of controlling evil-magical activities that are scarcely con-
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trollable and generally dangerous, the numinous power of the magicians, and
duties to ancestors and kin. Dangerous relationships and things become control-
lable, because (potentially) every believer can subject them to the power of the
Holy Spirit through prayer. This preserves the connection of religious praxis
to the traditional, magical "background world" (Weber) of spirits. But this back-
ground world now fulfìlls three functions: First, it enables apt linkages to tradi-
tional cognitive and judgmentai dispositions; second, it serves as an independent
and permanent threat scenario; and third, it is a quasi-magical operating terrain
for the Holy Spirit as represented by the pastors.
This religious strategy produces cognitive and emotional security in times of
intense socioeconomic upheaval and polarization. It thus facilitates entrance
into economic modernity, be it precarious or (in the case of the upwardly mobile)
brimming with opporfunity. In this, it draws on tradition to construct the mod-
ern social space as dualistic through the antagonism of good and evil powers,
the Holy Spirit and demons.
One special property of magic definitely does not get lost in this operation: its
uncompromising "this-worldliness" (Weber). Spirit-demon dualism is tightly
linked to interest in economic security and prosperity. One gets the strong
impression that Nigeria's prosperity discourse is at least as closely intercon-
nected with magical and exorcistic elements as Brazil's. Here, too, we see a socially
differentiated religious praxis dealing with economic matters, like in Latin
America. In the lower strata, special attention is devoted to avoiding the uncer-
tainty and precarious circumstances that arise from transformations in the
modes of consumption and production. Not least, personal dignity is at stake in
a context where it depends either on traditional kinship and religious affiliations
that are no longer very sustainable economically, or on successfully inserting
oneself into the new modes of production and consumption. Neither of these
works for poor Pentecostals. Their situation is characterized by strange new
products, visual worlds beamed into televisions from a numinous distance, the
sudden wealth of distant acquaintances, and their own inability to live up to the
new ideals. Here it helps to qualify unattainable worlds and things as Satan's
places. This allows people to concentrate the power of their imagination and
their labor on that which is attainable. Upwardly mobile modern professionals-
who might belong to Benson Idahosa's Church of God Mission, the Sword of
the Spirit, or one of the many other urban neo-Pentecostal congregations-have
the new products and transnational contacts directly within their reach. Here,
prosperity theology legitimates economic and social striving, and exorcisms
drive out the residues of traditional African bonds.
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Comparing the various attitudes on demonology in the three countries again
shows that ihe United States is the most intensely politicized. Since American
society lacks a tradition of dispositions to perceive such cosmologies, American
Pentecostals cannot build on them socially as Brazilians and-even more so-
Nigerians do. With the poiiticization of the neo-Pentecostal movement, it stands
to reason that such ideas get articulated not just in pastoral psychohygiene but
also in explicitly political forms.
By contrast, due to different cultural associations, the operational fields of
demonological logic in Nigeria and Brazil are mainly health, social and religious
relationships, and economic advancement. The doctrine of spiritual warfare
functions notably with the genuine ambiguity of religious logic: namely, its abil-
ity to associate any and all immanent things with transcendence-irrespective of
their sociai field of praxis-via analogical magic.
First, this logic makes it possibie to associate the two poles of symbolically con-
structed space-good and evil spirits-arbitrarily with any actors in society. Second,
it allows the terrn "spiritual" to be understood both as legrtimating physical vioience
and as demanding the renunciation of force. Actors who stand for the exclusion of
others from the political, religious, or cultural fields-such as the American Chns-
tian Right or the neo-Pentecostals in the Central American civil wars of the
1980s-seem to prefer the violence option. Those who emphasize their own inclu-
sion in dynamic social development-Pentecostals and neo-Pentecostals in Brazi.
and Nigeria-apparently prefer to fight their batties on a purely spiritual plane.
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The era of a politically neutral Pentecostal movement is long gone. Nonetheless,
we cannot say that the movement is uniformly involved in politics. A religious
habitus that operates with apocalyptic time concepts and starkly polarized con-
structions of social space is ambivalent and highly modifiable when it comes to
poiitical strategies. Concepts of space and time can either block or encourage
actors' political engagement, depending on their positions, interests, and oppor-
tunities for action. Consequently, we see important differences for political strat-
egies when we draw comparisons across countries and within the Pentecostal
movement. These differences are closely reiated to specific actors' cultural con-
texts, social positions, and opporfunities for action.
A comparison of these countries echoes the previousiy obser.red pattern: The
picture in the United States is significantly different than in Brazil and Nigeria.
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Figure 17: lmportance of politics as an aspect of life-USA
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E Not at all I Not very E lVoderately E Quite tr Very All data in percent
If one asks aboutthe importance of "politics" as an area of life, Pentecostals are
moderately politicized, and homogenously so (Figure 17). Only a few activists
(11,.5 %) consider politics very important and even fewer believers (5 %) attribute
no importance to it.
These findings are probably connected to two factors. First, much of the
American Pentecostal movement is rooted in the middle class, and from this
position it has developed certain interests and possibilities for influencing poli-
tics-even if only through voting. In addition, the entire movement has been
politicized since the 1970s by the Christian Right and the religiously charged
debates under Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.
The statistical picture cluite accurately reflects the current situation for reli-
gious consewatives. A small minority composed of upwardly mobile professio-
nals and full-time religious lobbyists-coming mostþ from neo-Pentecostal and
Charismatic churches-is highly active politically and can draw on a large reser-
voir of politicized adherents for support (direct-mail campaigns, donations, elec-
tions, etc.). A key factor in religious political mobilization is that people must
regard religious dispositions as important for their political opinions (Figure 18).
That is the case for 60 percent (M :4.30) of Pentecostals, while only 5 percent of
them assume no connection between politics and religion. Pentecostal churches
are thus considerably easier to mobilize with religious arguments than are other
Christians (and the total population). But this in itself does not express any polit-
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Figure 18: Extent to which religiosity affects political opinions-USA
Catholics Protestants (incl. Evangelicals) Pentecostals (incl, Charismatics)
I None I Not very [ lt4oderately E Quite a bit E Very much so All data in percent
ical bias. Nonetheless, in the United States one can assume that the vast majority
of politically mobilized Pentecostals identify with the Religious Right.
There are important overlaps in the leadership of the two movements, and it
has been the dedicated groups from the neo-Pentecostal movement that have
reshaped the religious dispositions of American fundamentalism over the past
30 years. They made the rhetoric of fìghting evil and apocalyptic urgency into a
new point of contact between religion and imperial politics.
Statistically, Nigeria forms the strongest contrast to the United States. The area
of "politics" is rated very differently by respondents from all groups, be they
Catholics, historical Protestants, or Pentecostals (Figure 19). Independent ofcon-
fession, there is even slight polarization discernible between those who see poli-
tics as very importanl (27 %o, average for Catholics, Protestants, and Pentecostals)
and those who feel it is unimportant (24%o).
This distribution persists when one asks how religiosity impacts political
opinions (Figure 20). Here, too, all combinations are represented in almost iden-
tical ways. This result cannot be explained by genuine religious reasons; instead,
it indicates the respondents' diverse social and cultural situation.
In Nigeria, these findings most probably are due to conditions that can be
observed in many societies that are highly polarized in terms of socioeconomics:
The members of the lower classes-whether in Latin America or Africa-use
religious strategies to cope with everyday life and only rarely for political involve-
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Figure 19: lmportance of politics as an aspect of life-Nigeria
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Figure 20: Extent to which religiosity affects political opinions-Nigeria
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ment. They tend to see politics as dangerous, and their activities concentrate
on solidarity within the congregation. The middle classes-especially those who
are upwardly mobile-show interest in political engagement in proportion to
their pace of advancement. Religious strategies thus tend to be applied to the
political arena. Through delegations of members, leaders of large neo-Pentecos-
tal churches manage to achìeve politically informal yet relevant positions in soci-
ety.
In Nigeria, such developments have been further fostered by the historical
tension between the Islamic north and the Christian south, as well as by the so-
called Shari'ah conflict of recent years. Due to this tension, Nigerian politics is
strongly defined by religious loyalties and differences. Especially over about the
past 15 years, part of Nigerian Christianity has also become noticeably politi-
cized. In the avant garde ofthis are the neo-Pentecostal churches, such as those
associated with Bishop Benson Idahosa, and thus the upwardly mobile middle
class.
The Christian umbrella organization Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN),
which Idahosa led for many yeaIs, and the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria
(PFN), which cooperates with it, have been deeply involved in politics, mobilìz-
ing the Christian population, publicly influencing elections, and cultivating tight
relationships with political leaders. Their strategies are based on the doctrine of
spiritual warfare.
An important position paper from 1989 (cited in Adogame 2005: 131) lays
out a paradigm in which Christians must engage in politics lest they cede the
field to demons. Instead, born-again Christians empowered by the Holy Spirit
must assume leadership of the country. At the same time, though, the actors
exploit the ambivalence of religious metaphors for a clever game between reli-
giously defined mobilization within the church and the moderate exercise of
political influence. In the 1,993 election, CAN and PFN supported a Muslim pres-
idential candidate, Abiola (however, he was not running against a Christian).
But in 1999, they welcomed the new christian president, obasanjo, as the leader
of a "god-fearing government."
In sum, one can say that the same is true for the political strategies of the
Nigerian Pentecostal movement as for most countries with strong social polar-
ization: The movement tends to be split into upwardly mobile, politically active
actors and socially weak ones who generally abstain from politics. Of course, the
Latin American situation gives this picture more nuance.
The data from Brazll strongly resemble the Nigerian data. Politically absti-
nent Pentecostals contrast noticeably with those who are interested in politics.
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Similar reasons account for this as in Nigeria. One factor is the opportunities for
action that are connected to social position. The development of the classic Pen-
tecostal AdD shows the importance of this factor. Several decades ago, political
involvement was unimaginable for its members. with the socioeconomic
advancement of many of its adherents to the middle class, today a growing num-
ber of its members are assuming public offìce, right up to members of parlia-
ment. The situation is similar for the IURD. The second factor is position within
a given church's internal hierarchy. Leadership positions are linked to social ad-
vancement as well as better opporhrnities for political acbion.
Finally, religious and political conflict plays a role. unlike in Nigeria, such
conflict in Brazil does not begin in the political fìeld and then transform into the
religious field. Instead, the religious competition among Catholicism, Protestan-
tism, and Afro-American religion is transformed into the political field. The
churches' political strategies are thus based in no small part on the political par-
ties' religious orientations. This leads to Candomblé and Pentecostals supporting
the left-liberal Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), since the conservatives tend to
sympathize with the Catholic Church.
Beyond this partisan structural formation aimed at the middle classes, new
political actors are emerging in the Latin American Pentecostal movement from
its smaller, independent churches. unlike in Afüca, christianity in Latin Amer-
ica has traditionally been confronted more with sociopolitical problems than
with cultural and ethnic ones.
From this vantage point, Pentecostal churches such as the unión Evangélica
Pentecostal venezolana and others are beginning to mobilize their members
socially and politicalþ in ways similar to those seen in the Catholic base com-
munities. This spawns religious actors who pursue grassroots political strategies
and enter into commensurate social, political, and church alliances, including
transnational networks such as the Conferencia Evangélica Pentecostal Latinoa-
mericana.
Transnational strategies are nearly as old as the Pentecostal movement itself.
From its earliest years, it cultivated an energetic program of missionary work
and correspondence. In addition, its key religious dispositions-the apocalyptic
time horizon and the cosmic battle-are intrinsically concerned with that which
is universal.
The Religion Monitor data confìrm a view of Pentecostalism as a worldwide
movement, which has long been quite clear to me as one of its observers. The
Pentecostal movement is by no means unitary, though it is indisputably global.
The diverse transnational fields of praxis, such as media production, mission
579
woïk, migïation, and local consumption of transnationally distributed media
products, indicate how many different ways the transnational can be approached.
Forms of patticipation in transnational relations vary according to where the
movement's collective actors are situated in the social struclure'
In order to understand these cause-effect relatronships, it is helpful to interpret
the movement's religious praxis in the context of its actors' position in local and
global social structures-thus making the interreiationships among "class, sta-
tus, and religion" (Weber) comprehensible even in a transnational perspective.
The Religion Monitor data furlher verify that the Pentecostal movement is
very diverse, g1oba11y. From a transnational perspective, many American
churches and organízation take for granted that they wrll act both locally and
globa1ly, in accordance with their economic resources. In Third World countries,
by contrast, the Pentecostal movement responds to people's experiences of desta-
bllizing modernization in the local context.
However, even here, organizations with a pan-regional or global reach have
sprung up, mostly among the upper and upper-middle classes. Of course, the
iower strata are also l-eached by the transnational flow of goods, images, and texts
through migration, consumption, and new relations of production. The decisive
thing for Pentecostal groups, however, is the ability to actively use the information
society's media and modern transporlation and to control their content'
As the movement becomes more socially polarized, the authority to access
the capital crucial to the information society is also becoming evel more
unequally allocated within the movement. Yet the religious media are (sti11) able
to address something like a pan-global Pentecostal identity and produce multi-
faceted communication. This helps cultivate a global network that is indeed
structured by power but-unlike the Catholic Church-is not a hierarchy. The
basis of identification for participants in this communication consists of a rela-
tively small inventory of easily recognizable symbols-a latent minimalist style,
so to speak-that help cognitiveiy and emotronally struclure social space and
social time, yet are so flexible that even actors with no formal education can
easily adapt them to any new situation.
The Pentecostal movement thus combines strong transnational coherence
through voluntary identification with tremendous iocal adaptability by means of
specifically modified religious (and yet "Pentecostal") identities. It characteristi-
ca11y differs from Catholicism, which is similarly globai, in that its transnatíonal
coherence does not rely on the formation of hierarchical institutional structures.
Instead, it operates by the logic of networks of more or less reciprocal relation-
ships and (mass-media) communication aimed at creating identification.
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This disqualifies the Pentecostal movement-in contrast to the catholic
Church-as an actor in the area of transnational institutions. But it also strength-
ens the movement's capacity to form flexible transnational networks and opera-
tions that can react highly effectively at a short notice to the changing needs and
opportunities of wide sections of the population. while this, in turn, pïomotes the
movement's global growth, it does not foster a unified sociopolitical position.
On the local level, the movement's adaptability is distinctþ more effective
than Catholic strategies of "inculturation of the Gospel." Since Pentecostal praxis
is not controlled by clerics, it can connect to the local situation from a lay per-
spective more or less spontaneously. Unlike Catholic strategies, it does not have
to obey externally imposed guidelines for academically trained clerics. Instead,
local activists use religious symbolism to directly mediate among local tensions,
differences in positions, and their own interests, which lets them much more
easily capitalize on them to enlarge their own groups.
In both transnational and local perspective, the Pentecostal movement oper-
ates as a social movement in a strong sense; only in exceptional cases does it
appear as an institution, and never as a dearly delimited system or apparatus. Its
decisive traits are: processes of identity and strategy formation for individual and
collective actors geared directly to the need for religious meaning and the oppor-
tunities for action in specifìc social circumstances; and voluntary religious com-
munity-building (Weber' s Vergerneinscha.ft.ungl.
We can best understand this with a sociological approach that offers suitable
methods for examining actors ønd structres as well as pracLices ønd signs-Ihatis
able to describe what is new about the transnational Pentecostal movement: It com-
bines minimalorganizaion and loose definitions of religious symbols with optimal
plausibility for actors caught up in combustible processes of social transformation.
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IPDA: Igreja Pentecostal Deus é Amor
FGBMFI : Full Gospel Businessmen's Fellowship International
IURD : Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus
PFN : Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria
RCCG : Redeemed Christian Church of God
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